Celo
Hokulea Integration

Assessed changes to Celo's op-succinct and Celo-kona components as part of the Hokulea integration.
report id
0679
category
Infra & Wallets
language
Rust
final report
November 25, 2025
lines of code
1381
Content

Download audit report

1

Executive Summary

This document presents the results of the security review conducted by Nethermind Security for Celo's integration of EigenDA Hokulea. Specifically on the op-succint side we review PR 572 and a diff with the op-succint upstream. As well as changes made to Celo-kona.

This audit focused on the end-to-end review of the above described changes. The audit comprises 1381 lines of Rust and Solidity code combined. The audit was performed using (a) manual analysis of the codebase, and (b) automated analysis tools.

It is important to note that the codebase does not include a test suite. Implementing a comprehensive suite of tests before deployment is essential to validate the protocol’s behavior and ensure its correctness. We recommend that the Celo team develop and maintain such a suite, covering both expected workflows and edge-case scenarios.

Audit assessment
Audit TypeSecurity Review
Initial ReportOctober 13, 2025
Final ReportNovember 25, 2025
Initial op-succint PR 572 Commit Hashb62d805e71
Initial op-succint diff Commit Hash54657eb0e9
Initial Celo-kona Commit Hash0a5129b4d5
Final op-succint Commit Hashfb8a7766f6
Final Celo-kona Commit Hasha90700bd28
Documentation AssessmentHigh
Test Suite AssessmentHigh
Total findings
4
Fixed
4
Acknowledged
0
Mitigated
0
Unresolved
0

Findings by severity

  • Critical0
  • High0
  • Medium0
  • Low1
  • Informational1
  • Best Practices2

2

Audited Files

#ContractLoC
1transfer.rs115
Total115

4

System Overview

4.1 PR 572

The primary objective of PR 572 is to implement comprehensive Eigen DA support within the Hokulea component of the OP Succinct stack. Specifically, it extends Hokulea’s derivation and batch-processing pipeline to natively interact with EigenDA as a data availability backend. This includes enabling the system to submit, retrieve, and verify data blobs via the EigenDA proxy, manage KZG commitment verification, and ensure robust failover handling.

By introducing these capabilities, the PR allows rollups built on OP Succinct to seamlessly operate using EigenDA as their data availability layer, thereby enhancing modularity, scalability, and interoperability across different DA solutions.

4.2 op-succint diff

The OP-Succinct zero-knowledge proof system has been updated with several key shifts. First, it now supports the Celo blockchain instead of just Optimism. All core types were replaced to integrate Celo’s OP Stack-based L2, enabling validity proofs for Celo transactions that include its custom EVM extensions and transaction formats.

The ConfigureDeploymentSafe.s.sol script batches configuration calls via Safe delegate transactions, while the main script (DeployOPSuccinctFDG.s.sol) now separates the rollout into three clear stages: deploy, configure, and activate.

Finally, the SP1 prover setup moved from FulfillmentStrategy::Hosted (which skipped simulation) to FulfillmentStrategy::Reserved (with simulation enabled). This ensures more rigorous validation and guarantees reserved prover capacity. A new configurable cycle limit parameter—defaulting to 3 billion cycles—was also introduced for finer-grained control over proof execution.

4.3 Celo-kona

The transfer precompile was reviewed. The transfer precompile enables the sending of the native token of a different user to that who is calling the contract on-chain.

The precompile takes in the context, input, caller address, and the gas limit. The initial checks it performs are that the gas cost is greater than the minimum transfer gas cost of 9 thousand, that the caller address is the celo token address and that the input length is 96 bytes. The input contains the from, to and value values in one array.

Then it stores the warmth (cold or warm) of the to address and performs the transfer based on the input values. This applies a state change to the journal. Finally, it resets the warmth of the address to its initial value.

5

Risk Rating Methodology

The risk rating methodology used by Nethermind Security follows the principles established by the OWASP Foundation. The severity of each finding is determined by two factors: Likelihood and Impact.

Likelihood measures how likely the finding is to be uncovered and exploited by an attacker. This factor will be one of the following values:

  1. High: the issue is trivial to exploit and has no specific conditions that need to be met;
  2. Medium: the issue is moderately complex and may have some conditions that need to be met;
  3. Low: the issue is very complex and requires very specific conditions to be met.

When defining the likelihood of a finding, other factors are also considered. These can include but are not limited to motive, opportunity, exploit accessibility, ease of discovery, and ease of exploit.

Impact is a measure of the damage that may be caused if an attacker exploits the finding. This factor will be one of the following values:

  1. High: the issue can cause significant damage, such as loss of funds or the protocol entering an unrecoverable state;
  2. Medium: the issue can cause moderate damage, such as impacts that only affect a small group of users or only a particular part of the protocol;
  3. Low: the issue can cause little to no damage, such as bugs that are easily recoverable or cause unexpected interactions that cause minor inconveniences.

When defining the impact of a finding, other factors are also considered. These can include but are not limited to data and state integrity, loss of availability, financial loss, and reputation damage. After defining the likelihood and impact of an issue, the severity is determined according to the table below.

Impact / LikelihoodLowMediumHigh
HighMediumHighCritical
MediumLowMediumHigh
LowInfo / Best PracticesLowMedium
UndeterminedUndeterminedUndeterminedUndetermined

To address issues that do not fit a High, Medium or Low severity, Nethermind Security also uses three more finding severities: Informational, Best Practices, and Undetermined.

  1. Informational findings do not pose any risk to the application, but they carry some information that the audit team intends to pass to the client formally;
  2. Best Practice findings are used when some piece of code does not conform with smart contract development best practices;
  3. Undetermined findings are used when we cannot predict the impact or likelihood of the issue.

6

Issues

6.1 Insecure crate used

FileFix commitTypeStatus
cargo.tomlPR #78
PR #33
LowFixed

Usage of tracing-subscriber package version 0.3.19 is deemed insecure as logging user input may result in poisoning logs with ANSI escape sequences explained in RUSTSEC.

Recommendation

Upgrade to version >=0.3.20.

Resolution

Created patch PR in both celo-kona and op-succinct: PR 78 PR 33

6.2 Duplicate code leading to redundant cycles

FileFix commitTypeStatus
main.rs
lib.rs
PR #38InfoFixed

In both main.rs and lib.rs/run_range_program(...) the function get_oracle_and_blob_provider(...) is called to create an oracle and a blob store. This means the same code is executed twice and can thus slow down the proving time of the code.

Recommendation

Editing the function run_range_program(...) to take as parameters the oracle and blob store, as this would mean that it would not need to be recalculated.

Resolution

Included in the following

6.3 Gas behavior differs if precompile is used outside GoldToken

FileFix commitTypeStatus
precompiles/transfer.rsPR #77Best PracticesFixed

The transfer precompile’s run(...) function restores the warmness of the to address after performing a balance transfer but does not restore the warmness of the from address. In the current system, this behavior is correct and has no side effects because the precompile is always invoked through the GoldToken contract.

Before calling the precompile, GoldToken performs a balance check on the from address, which triggers the EVM BALANCE opcode:

function balanceOf(address owner) public view returns (uint256) {
//@audit BALANCE opcode warms `owner`
return owner.balance;
}

According to EVM semantics, any address accessed via the BALANCE opcode is automatically added to the access list and becomes warm. Therefore, by the time the precompile executes, the from account is already warm, and restoring its warmness state is unnecessary.

However, this assumption only holds as long as the precompile is invoked through GoldToken. If the precompile were to be called directly by another contract or address that does not access from beforehand, the from address could start as cold. In such a case, the internal journal.transfer(...) call would mark it warm and alter gas metering for the remainder of the transaction.

Recommendation

Consider documenting that the from address is guaranteed to be warm when the precompile is called through GoldToken.

Resolution

Made a PR for it and merged PR 77.

6.4 Missing STATICCALL guard allows state-changing precompile to be invoked in static context

FileFix commitTypeStatus
precompiles/transfer.rsPR #79Best PracticesFixed

The transfer_run(...) flow exposes a state-changing precompile that debits and credits balances through journal().transfer(...). This precompile is intended to be called only by the token contract in standard, non-static execution, and it charges gas before returning. However, the implementation does not verify whether the call is being executed under STATICCALL (static context). In static context, EVM semantics prohibit state changes. Despite that, the code proceeds to execute the transfer, which attempts to mutate state.

fn run<CTX>(
context: &mut CTX,
input: &Bytes,
caller_address: Address,
gas_limit: u64,
) -> PrecompileResult
where
CTX: ContextTr<Cfg: Cfg<Spec = OpSpecId>>,
{
// ...
if input.len() != 96 {
return Err(PrecompileError::Other("invalid input length".to_string()));
}
// ...
// @audit This call mutates state but there is no STATICCALL guard before it.
let result = context.journal().transfer(from, to, value);
// ...
}

Recommendation

Consider introducing a strict check that rejects execution when the precompile is invoked in a static context. The precompile should exit early with an error indicating that state changes are not allowed during static calls.

Resolution

Opened a PR PR 79.

7

Documentation Evaluation

Software documentation refers to the written or visual information that describes the functionality, architecture, design, and implementation of software. It provides a comprehensive overview of the software system and helps users, developers, and stakeholders understand how the software works, how to use it, and how to maintain it. Software documentation can take different forms, such as user manuals, system manuals, technical specifications, requirements documents, design documents, and code comments. Software documentation is critical in software development, enabling effective communication between developers, testers, users, and other stakeholders. It helps to ensure that everyone involved in the development process has a shared understanding of the software system and its functionality. Moreover, software documentation can improve software maintenance by providing a clear and complete understanding of the software system, making it easier for developers to maintain, modify, and update the software over time. Smart contracts can use various types of software documentation. Some of the most common types include:

  • Technical whitepaper: A technical whitepaper is a comprehensive document describing the smart contract’s design and technical details. It includes information about the purpose of the contract, its architecture, its components, and how they interact with each other;
  • User manual: A user manual is a document that provides information about how to use the smart contract. It includes step-by-step instructions on how to perform various tasks and explains the different features and functionalities of the contract;
  • Code documentation: Code documentation is a document that provides details about the code of the smart contract. It includes information about the functions, variables, and classes used in the code, as well as explanations of how they work;
  • API documentation: API documentation is a document that provides information about the API (Application Programming Interface) of the smart contract. It includes details about the methods, parameters, and responses that can be used to interact with the contract;
  • Testing documentation: Testing documentation is a document that provides information about how the smart contract was tested. It includes details about the test cases that were used, the results of the tests, and any issues that were identified during testing;
  • Audit documentation: Audit documentation includes reports, notes, and other materials related to the security audit of the smart contract. This type of documentation is critical in ensuring that the smart contract is secure and free from vulnerabilities.

These types of documentation are essential for smart contract development and maintenance. They help ensure that the contract is properly designed, implemented, and tested, and they provide a reference for developers who need to modify or maintain the contract in the future.

8

Remarks & Test Suite

Celo's team addressed all questions and concerns raised by the Nethermind Security team, providing valuable insights and a comprehensive understanding of the project's technical aspects.

Test suite
53Tests passed0Failed

The complete test output is in the full report.

As auditors, we recommend that any changes or updates made to the audited codebase undergo a re-audit or security review to address potential vulnerabilities or risks introduced by the modifications. By conducting a re-audit or security review of the modified codebase, you can significantly enhance the overall security of your system and reduce the likelihood of exploitation. However, we do not possess the authority or right to impose obligations or restrictions on our clients regarding codebase updates, modifications, or subsequent audits. Accordingly, the decision to seek a re-audit or security review lies solely with you.

This report is based on the scope of materials and documentation provided by you to Nethermind in order that Nethermind could conduct the security review outlined in 1. Executive Summary and 2. Audited Files. The results set out in this report may not be complete nor inclusive of all vulnerabilities. Nethermind has provided the review and this report on an as-is, where-is, and as-available basis. You agree that your access and/or use, including but not limited to any associated services, products, protocols, platforms, content, and materials, will be at your sole risk. Blockchain technology remains under development and is subject to unknown risks and flaws. The review does not extend to the compiler layer, or any other areas beyond the programming language, or other programming aspects that could present security risks. This report does not indicate the endorsement of any particular project or team, nor guarantee its security. No third party should rely on this report in any way, including for the purpose of making any decisions to buy or sell a product, service or any other asset. To the fullest extent permitted by law, Nethermind disclaims any liability in connection with this report, its content, and any related services and products and your use thereof, including, without limitation, the implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, and non-infringement. Nethermind does not warrant, endorse, guarantee, or assume responsibility for any product or service advertised or offered by a third party through the product, any open source or third-party software, code, libraries, materials, or information linked to, called by, referenced by or accessible through the report, its content, and the related services and products, any hyperlinked websites, any websites or mobile applications appearing on any advertising, and Nethermind will not be a party to or in any way be responsible for monitoring any transaction between you and any third-party providers of products or services. As with the purchase or use of a product or service through any medium or in any environment, you should use your best judgment and exercise caution where appropriate. FOR AVOIDANCE OF DOUBT, THE REPORT, ITS CONTENT, ACCESS, AND/OR USAGE THEREOF, INCLUDING ANY ASSOCIATED SERVICES OR MATERIALS, SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED OR RELIED UPON AS ANY FORM OF FINANCIAL, INVESTMENT, TAX, LEGAL, REGULATORY, OR OTHER ADVICE.